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O &amp; M 4-2

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Ch/G/RR

DATE: 18 June 1958

FROM : SA to Ch/G/RR

SUBJECT: Operation Alert, 16 - 18 July 1958

1. I feel strongly that the DD/I plan for Operation Alert 1958 does not address itself to the essential tasks. Such tasks I would itemize as follows:

a. To pursue and establish inter-agency understandings whereby the support currently available to the CIA from the intelligence files and working personnel of other agencies would continue to be available to CIA in a wartime situation. To establish particularly the coordinations necessary for the operation of such mutual support under conditions of relocation. CIA in turn to continue the working-level support it provides. This task to concern itself with agencies whose support, or servicing, is held to be of major importance in the CIA mission--e.g., AMS, Air Force Targets, State Department research and intelligence, etc.

b. To pursue and establish understandings as to inter-agency projects that will be conducted in wartime. To make necessary logistical plans in support of the operation of these projects.

c. To familiarize personnel and test management techniques by conducting command post exercises which involve the intelligence community. If this is not initially possible, to conduct CPX's in concert with the DD/P and the DD/S. Such dry runs are essential to the Agency's preparedness. To date, there have been none. The DD/I CPX in 1956 was useful, but in a very limited and misleading way.

2. The DD/I plan that is proposed for Operation Alert 1958 concerns itself instead with tasks that can be accomplished only following completion of 1 a and b above. In addition, the tasks, as stated, are rather unnecessary. What is needed on the working level is rather a translation of policy into working plans--an assessment of specific

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*a quantitative*

project types that will be worked jointly, the qualitative limits to requests accepted, and so forth. This cannot be done until the policy level has acted to effect arrangements with Army, Navy, Air, NSA, and State.

3. I recommend, therefore, that:


a. The present plan be cancelled.

*If possible,*

b. A new plan involving a CPX with the DD/P and DD/S be substituted.

c. The CIA lend every effort to negotiate an early agreement with the other intelligence agencies as to the wartime support that may be expected by one from the others, and the means by which it can be effected.

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